Tankology 101: How Sashi Brown rebuilt the Cleveland Browns, and nearly destroyed them

How they stockpiled picks

The rebuilding is accomplished by the football version of ‘Moneyball’”  That is moves are made on the basis of mathematical calculation and value assessment, not by gut feel. Draft picks, players and wins can be compared using the same valuation theory used by Harvard economists to evaluate the true value of corporations.

mportant parts of the process were worked out years ago by the Dallas Cowboys who assigned “Schramm Points” to draft picks to compare them. The index is set with a mid-first-round draft pick worth 1000 points.  The first overall pick is worth three times as much, and the last pick in the first round is worth only 590 points. Modern analytics strategists ask whether those sharp differentials in value are warranted given that your scouting is imperfect, and if so that means that the Schramm values at the top of the first round are over-valued.

An important question is how to evaluate the trade of future resources for present resources.  As a whole, the NFL generally assumes that future years are not very important. This is certainly a gross error. For example in 2007 the Browns traded a 2nd round 36th overall pick (540 Schramm points) plus a 2008 first round (let’s assume that it would have been estimated at mid first round or 1000 points), and in return the Cowboys gave a first round pick, 22nd overall used to draft Brady Quinn (780 Schramm points). For this move to come out even, you have to downgrade the 2008 first round pick to 240 points instead of 1000, a discount factor of 76% for a one year delay in draft value.

Needless to say, the Browns’ trade for Quinn was enough to make an analytics expert gag.  How can you afford to lose 76 percent of an immensely valuable resource? Phil Savage and the Browns were grinning from ear to ear, believing that the 2008 draft could be given away cheaply.  But reality set in when the 2008 draft rolled around, and they realized that they really did want to have a first-round draft choice.

The Cowboys, on the other hand, wound up immensely pleased with the deal.  More than likely, a rebuilding team should be willing to give up a draft pick this year in order to move up in next year’s draft and gain an extra pick. This explains why the Browns were willing to trade the second overall pick in 2016 (who turned out to be Carson Wentz) and then take that haul and trade back again.   In terms of Schramm points, over three years the Browns received picks scored at 4790 points (3 number 1’s, 1 number 2’s, 4 number 3’s, 2 number 4’s and a number 5).

The Browns gave up the second overall pick and a number 4 (1874 points). The trade was a fantastic potential haul for the Browns, but was ruined by Brown’s horrific selection of Corey Coleman.

Table 1 was downloaded from http://walterfootball.com/draftchart.php

Managing the Salary Cap

Sashi and the Browns also had radical ideas on how to manipulate the  salary cap. Their concept was to create the ability to massively outspend the rest of the league in year 4 and 5 of the rebuilding program, but this required underspending in years 1 and  2 and to a lesser extent in year 3.

Brown and DePodesta realized that expensive veteran players actually work against the goal of team building. Because the salary cap rules permit teams to save money for the future, money spent in 2016 would not be available for 2019 when the team would actually try to win it all.  Hence, any veteran that did not appear to have the potential to contribute to the 2019 Browns (i.e., three years ahead) would be cut. In addition, the Browns would not sign multiyear contracts with veterans older than about age 27. Hence guys with moderately high salaries, like Paul Kruger, Karlos Dansby, Tramon Williams, Josh McCown, Desmond Bryant, Donte Whitner, Gary Barnidge and Joe Haden were cut.

Other veterans were allowed to leave in free agency even they might have been interested in staying. Losing stalwart right tackle Mitchell Schwartz was a disastrous move, but if your goal was to draft Myles Garrett first overall, it was a pretty good move because with no offense a 1-15 record resulted.

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A particularly interesting case was Brock Osweiler. In this case, the Houston Texans realized that they no longer wanted Osweiler to be the first string quarterback, but they were committed to spending $16 million in salary for 2017.  The Browns agreed to assume the $16 million salary cap charge, but in exchange, the Texans had to give the Browns a second-round draft pick. One way to look at the trade is the Texans gained the ability to pay a free agent $4 Million dollars a year for four years of a free agent (or whatever they want to total $16 Million), while the Browns made a commitment to a future second-round draft pick for four years.

The net effect for the Browns was to transfer on-field assets from the 2017 team to the 2018 team. Even though the money was taken away from what could have been used to sign players for 2017, the return, in the form of draft pick Nick Chubb, didn’t occur until 2018.  The reduced level of on-field talent contributed to the Browns’ poor performance and their ability to draft at the first overall position in 2018 to select Baker Mayfield.

The 2017 team paid only $106 million in salaries to players who actually took the field, the second lowest total in the NFL. $48 Million was spent on players who were not on the field, including Osweiler as the biggest expense. The contributed strongly to 0-16.

The key to the trade should have been Osweiler, if he could have either played for the Browns or been traded for something tangible. Instead, the Browns just cast him aside and paid his salary so that he could sign as a bargain free agent to be the backup quarterback for the Denver Broncos. If you are getting the idea that Sashi Brown was not all that interested in winning football games in 2017, you are probably correct.

While the 2017 team had one of the lowest outlays for salaries of players on the field, the 2018 squad was supposed to turn things around, and hopefully enough to impress free agents and their agents to the extent that they would be willing again to sign with the Browns without demanding extra financial inducement to come to Cleveland. The 2019 and 2020 roster was intended to be one of the highest paid in the league, as salary cap space created in 2016 and 2017 would finally be used to overspend.